Recently, ε-almost dual universal2 hash functions has been proposed as a new and wider class of hash functions. This class well works even when the random seeds of hash function are subject to non-uniform distribution. This paper evaluates the security performance when we apply this kind of hash functions. We evaluate the security in several kinds of setting based on the L1 distinguishability criterion and the modified mutual information criterion. The obtained evaluation is based on smoothing of Rényi entropy of order 2 and/or min entropy. Further, we apply this analysis to the secret key generation with error correction.
I. INTRODUCTION

A. Overview
Secure key generation is an important problem in information theoretic security. When a part of keys are leaked to a third party, we cannot use the key. In this case, we need to apply a hash function to the keys. Bennett et al. [4] and Håstad et al. [15] proposed to use universal 2 hash functions for privacy amplification and derived two universal hashing lemma, which provides an upper bound for leaked information based on Rényi entropy of order 2. Recently, Tsurumaru et al. [14] proposed to use ǫ-almost dual universal 2 hash functions, which is a generalization of liner universal 2 hash functions, and obtained a different version of two universal hashing lemma for this class of hash functions. Further, the recent paper [34] shows that the ǫ-almost dual universality 2 well works even when the random seeds of the hash function are subject to a non-uniform distribution while the ǫ-almost universality 2 does not well work in this case. The paper [34] gives concrete examples of ε-almost universal 2 hash functions that have a smaller calculation amount and a smaller number of random variables than the concatenation of Toeplitz matrix and the identity matrix, which is a typical example of universal 2 hash functions. Since it is quite difficult to realize the perfect random seeds, it is required from a practical viewpoint to evaluate the security based on the ǫ-almost dual universality 2 .
Two universal hashing lemma can guarantee the security only when the length of the generated keys is less than Rényi entropy of order 2. In order to resolve this drawback, Renner [16] attached the smoothing to min entropy, which is a lower bound of conditional Rényi entropy of order 2. That is, he proposed to maximize the min-entropy among the sub-distribution whose variational distance to the true distribution is less than a given threshold. He also employs the variational distance between the true distribution and the ideal distribution as the security criterion because it satisfies the universal composability. We call this criterion the L 1 distinguishability criterion. Then, he derived lower bound of the extractable key length with finite-length under the L 1 distinguishability criterion for universal 2 hash functions. In other word, when we fix the size of keys, he derived a lower bound of leaked information. However, it is not easy to find the maximizing sub-distribution. he did not give the rigorous maximization of min entropy under this condition. That is, he did not give a computable lower bound when the block size is sufficiently large. Instead of the rigorous maximization of min entropy under this condition, we can consider a lower bound of the maximum of min entropy. In the following, we say that this type lower bound or the method based on this type lower bound is an approximate smoothing of min entropy. In contrast with an approximate smoothing, we say that the tight value of min entropy under the given condition or the method based on the tight value is the rigorous smoothing of min entropy. It has been believed that the rigorous smoothing of min entropy yields a good upper bound of the L 1 distinguishability criterion.
Instead of min entropy, the previous paper [12] applied an approximate smoothing of Rényi entropy of order 2, and derived a lower bound of leaked information explicitly for universal 2 hash functions under the L 1 distinguishability criterion . The calculation amount of the obtained bound [12] does not depend on the block size. In the independent and identical distributed case, when the key generation rate is fixed, the bound yields a lower bound of the exponential decreasing rate of leaked information. The tightness is also shown in the recent paper [38, Theorem 30] . Currently, it has not been clarified the difference between the maximization of min entropy and the maximization of of Rényi entropy of order 2. This paper focuses this kind of difference in several settings.
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On the other hand, many papers [52] , [53] , [7] , [6] , [54] , [55] , [24] , [39] , [40] , [41] , [42] , [43] , [44] , [45] , [46] , [47] , [48] , [49] , [50] , [25] employ the mutual information as the security criterion. When we apply universal 2 hash functions, the previous paper [13] derived an upper bound of leaked information in this criterion by generalizing two universal hashing lemma. Then, it shows the security when the key generation rate is less than the conditional entropy in the independent and identical distributed case. This paper gives exponential decreasing rate of mutual information. However, the mutual information does not reflect the uniformity while it reflects the independence. In order to address with the uniformity as well as leaked information, we need the modification of mutual information, which is called the modified mutual information criterion and is explained in Subsection II-C. Indeed, as is shown in Appendix A, when we assume several natural conditions for our security criterion, the security criterion is restricted to the modified mutual information criterion. Hence, it is natural to employ this criterion.
When one of two security criteria goes to zero exponentially, the other also goes to zero exponentially due to the relations given in Subsection II-C. Hence, the asymptotic key generation rate does not depend on the choice of the security criterion. However, the relations given in Subsection II-C cannot decide one of their exponential decreasing rates from the other exponent. Hence, we need to consider both exponents separately.
Here, we also notice the method of information spectrum, which is a powerful and general tool for information theory. Information spectrum has been established by Han and Vérdu in their seminal papers [58] , [59] , [60] , [61] , [26] and the book [23] . This method can derive asymptotically tight bounds of the optimal performances of various information processings. While the relation between the rigorous smoothing of min entropy and the information spectrum has been pointed out with the fidelity distance in [17] , it has not been discussed based on the variational distance. This paper also addresses this relation.
B. Contributions
This paper shows the following five results. First, combining an approximate smoothing and the result in [14] , we derive a lower bound of leaked information in the L 1 distinguishability criterion even when we apply ǫ-almost dual universal 2 hash functions. Then, we derive the exponential decreasing rate of leaked information under the L 1 distinguishability criterion under an application of ǫ-almost dual universal 2 hash functions. We also consider the second order asymptotics [18] , [19] , [22] , [20] , [21] . Under this formulation, we show that the optimality can be realized even when ǫ-almost dual universal 2 hash functions are applied.
Second, we derive a lower bound of leaked information in the L 1 distinguishability criterion even when we apply ǫ-almost dual universal 2 hash functions. In this case, we cannot employ the method in [13] . We invent another smoothing method of Rényi entropy of order 2 for the modified mutual information criterion. Then, by using the obtained bound, we derive a lower bound of the exponential decreasing rate of leaked information under the mutual information criterion under the class of ǫ-almost dual universal 2 hash functions.
Third, under the both criteria, we analyze the difference between the exponential decreasing rates of the rigorous smoothing of min entropy and our particular rigorous smoothing of Rényi entropy of order 2. Then, we show that the exponential decreasing rates by the rigorous smoothing of min entropy are strictly worse than those by our approximate smoothing of Rényi entropy of order 2 under both criteria. This fact indicates the importance of smoothing of Rényi entropy of order 2. These three results are given in Sections IV and VI. Additionally, in Section V, we clarify the relation between the information spectrum and the rigorous smoothing of min entropy in the single shot setting. This characterization is helpful for evaluation based on the rigorous smoothing of min entropy.
Fourth, in section VIII, we also discuss the case when the key generation rate is greater than the conditional entropy rate. In this case, the leaked information behaves linearly with respect to the block size when the modified mutual information criterion is employed. Employing our approximate smoothing of min entropy, we show that the application of ǫ-almost dual universal 2 hash functions yields asymptotically optimal rate of leaked information. That is, only the exponential decreasing rate has the difference between the smoothing of Rényi entropy of order 2 and the smoothing of min entropy. We show that the other settings have no difference between two methods in the asymptotic setting.
Finally, in Section VI, we apply our result to the case with error correction. Then, we obtain upper bounds of both security criteria when we apply an error correction and ǫ-almost dual universal 2 hash functions. This process requires several formulas among information quantities given in Section II. These obtained results are summarized as Table I .
One might consider why we discuss the exponential decreasing rate as well as the second order asymptotics. The recent paper [29] numerically showed that the superiority between the finite bounds based on the exponential decreasing rate and the second order asymptotics depends on the parameters, e.g., the number of block size and the required level of the L 1 distinguishability criterion. When the required level of the L 1 distinguishability criterion is small and the number of block size is not so large, the bounds based on the exponential decreasing rate gives a better bound. Conversely, when the required level of the L 1 distinguishability criterion is not so small and the number of block size is sufficiently large, the bounds based on the second order asymptotics gives a better bound.
Here, we should remark the relation with the result with the quantum case. The paper [57] derived lower bounds of exponential decreasing rates of both criteria under the ǫ-almost dual universal 2 hash functions. However, as is explained in Remark 4, their bounds are strictly worse than our results. The paper [57] did not discuss the exponential decreasing rates of the rigorous smoothing of min entropy because of its difficulty. Further, the paper [57] did not address with the second order analysis. Hence, our results cannot be contained in the paper [57] .
C. Organization
The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows. Now, we give the outline of the preliminary parts. In Section II, we introduce the information quantities for evaluating the security and derive several useful inequalities for the quantum case. We also give a clear definition for security criteria. In Section III, we introduce several class of hash functions (universal 2 hash functions and ǫ-almost dual universal 2 hash functions). We clarify the relation between ǫ-almost dual universal 2 hash functions and δ-biased ensemble. We also derive an ǫ-almost dual universal 2 version of two universal hashing lemma based on Lemma for δ-biased ensemble given by Dodis et al [9] . The latter preliminary parts are more technical and used for proofs of the main results. In Section IV, under the ǫ-almost dual universal 2 condition, we evaluate the L 1 distinguishability criterion and the modified mutual information based on the rigorous smoothing of min entropy and Rényi entropy of order 2. These parts give the definitions for concepts and quantities describing the main results. These parts are almost included in the papers [14] , [57] . However, these papers are written in the quantum terminologies. For readers' convenience, we describe these parts without quantum notations.
Next, we outline the main results. In Section V, using the tail probability of a proper event, we evaluate upper bounds given by the rigorous smoothing of min entropy in Section IV with the single-shot setting. This tail probability plays a central role in information spectrum. The bounds obtained in this section have smaller complexity for calculation than those given in Section IV. In Section VI, using the information quantities given in Section II, we evaluate upper bounds given in Section IV. The bounds obtained in this section have smaller complexity for calculation than those given in Sections V and IV. In Section VII, we derive an exponential decreasing rate for both criteria when we simply apply hash functions and there is no error between Alice's and Bob's information. In Section VIII, we also discuss the case when the key generation rate is greater than the conditional entropy rate.
In Section IX, we proceed to the secret key generation with error correction. In this case, we need error correction as well as the privacy amplification. We derive Gallager bound for the error probability in this setting. We also derive upper bounds for the L 1 distinguishability criterion and the modified mutual information for a given sacrifice rate. Based on these upper bounds, we derive the exponential decreasing rates for both criteria. In Section X, we apply our result to the simplest case.
II. PREPARATION
A. Information quantities for single system 1) Case of sub-distributions: In order to discuss the security problem, we prepare several information quantities for subdistributions P A Q A on a space A. That is, these are assumed to satisfy the conditions P A (a) ≥ 0 and a P A (a) ≤ 1.
Shannon entropy, Rényi entropy of order 1 + s, and min entropy are given as
with s ∈ R \ {0}. Then, the function s → sH 1+s (A|P A ) is concave. Since a P A (a) 1+s ≤ max a P A (a) s for s > 0, we have
Taking the limit, we obtain the equality
Now, we introduce two information quantities.
Then, we can show that the map s → ψ(s|P A Q A ) is convex. When we apply a stochastic matrix Λ on A, the information processing inequalities
hold for s ∈ (0, 1]. This quantity satisfies the following property. Lemma 1:
is monotonically increasing for s in (0, ∞) and (−∞, 0). Proof: For s 1 > s 2 > 0, the convexity yields that
Since
For s 2 < s 1 < 0, the convexity yields that
which implies that 1
Therefore, we obtain the desired argument.
In the following, P mix,A expresses the uniform distribution on the set A. Since H 1+s (A|P A ) = log |A| − 1 s ψ(s|P A P mix,A ), applying Lemma 1, we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 2:
The quantity H 1+s (A|P A ) is monotonically decreasing for s in (−∞, 0) and (0, ∞).
2) Case of normalized distributions: When P A and Q A are normalized distributions, the following useful properties hold. In this case, since lim s→0 H 1+s (A|P A ) = 0, we have lim s→0 H 1+s (A|P A,E ) = H(A|P A ). Hence, we denote H(A|P A,E ) by
Further, we have ψ(0|P A Q A ) = 0. Hence, the concavity of
. Then, Lemma 1 yields the following lemma.
Lemma 3: When P A and Q A are normalized distributions,
for s > 0 . Applying Lemma 3, we obtain the following lemma. Lemma 4: When P A is a normalized distribution,
for s > 0.
B. Information quantities for composite system
1) Case of joint sub-distribution: Next, we prepare several information quantities for a joint sub-distribution P A,E on subsets A and E. In the following discussion, the sub-distribution P A and P A,E is not necessarily normalized, and is assumed to satisfy the condition a P A (a) ≤ 1 or a,e P A,E (a, e) ≤ 1. For the sub-distributions P A and P A,E , we define the normalized distributions P A,normal and P A,E,normal by P A,normal (a) := P A (a)/ a P A (a) and P A,E,normal (a, e) := P A,E (a, e)/ a,e P A,E (a, e). For a sub-distribution P A,E , we define the marginal sub-distribution P A on A by P A (a) := e∈E P A,E (a, e). Then, we define the conditional sub-distribution P A|E on A by P A|E (a|e) := P A,E (a, e)/P E,normal (e).
The conditional entropy, the conditional Rényi entropies, and the conditional min entropy are given as
with s ∈ R \ {0}. Then, the function s → sH 1+s (A|E|P A,E ) is concave. Since e P E,normal (e) a P A|E (a|e) 1+s ≤ max a,e:PE (e)>0 P A|E (a|e) s for s > 0, we have
The conditional Shannon entropy and the conditional Rényi entropy: can be described as follows.
where P mix,A is the uniform distribution on the set that the random variable A takes values in. When we replace P E,normal by another normalized distribution Q E on E, we can generalize the above quantities.
The quantity H 1+s (A|E|P A,E Q E ) can be regarded as a generalization of H 2 (A|E|P A,E Q E ) by Renner [16] . Further, similar to Lemma 2, applying Lemma 1, we obtain the following lemma. for s > 0, we have
Due to (5), when we apply an operation Λ on E, it does not act on the system A. Then,
In particular, the inequalities
hold. Conversely, when we apply the function f to the random number a ∈ A, we have
Now, we introduce another kind of conditional Rényi entropy for a joint normalized distribution P A,E as
This quantity can be expressed as
by using the Gallager-type [8] function [12] :
Lemma 6: For s ∈ [−1, 1] \ {0}, a joint sub-distribution P A,E satisfies the relation
The equality holds only when P A|E=e is uniform distribution for all e ∈ E. The proof of Lemma 6 is given in Appendix B The opposite type inequality also holds as follows.
Lemma 7:
A joint sub-distribution P A,E satisfies the relation
for s ∈ [−1, ∞)\{0}. 
This inequality will be employed for the security analysis when error correction is applied.
2) Case of joint normalized distribution: When P A,E is a joint normalized distribution, the additional useful properties hold as follows. In this case, since lim s→0 sH 1+s (A|E|P A,E ) = 0, we have lim s→0 H 1+s (A|E|P A,E ) = H(A|E|P A,E ). Hence, we define H 1 (A|E|P A,E ) to be H(A|E|P A,E ). Further, similar to Lemma 4, applying Lemma 3, we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 8: When P A,E and Q E are normalized distributions,
for s > 0. Similar properties hold for H G 1+s (A|E|P A,E ) as follows. Lemma 9:
When we regard H 
The remaining properties will be shown in Appendix D. [63] pointed out that these quantities do not satisfy the chain rule. Instead, Muller-Lennert et al [64, Proposition 7] showed the inequality H
. Also, the paper [65, Corollary 77] shows the inequality
C. Criteria for secret random numbers 1) Case of joint sub-distribution: Next, we introduce criteria for the amount of the information leaked from the secret random number A to E for joint sub-distribution P A,E . Using the ℓ 1 norm, we can evaluate the secrecy for the state P A,E as follows:
Taking into account the randomness, Renner [16] employed the L 1 distinguishability criteria for security of the secret random number A:
which can be regarded as the difference between the true sub-distribution P A,E and the ideal sub-distribution P mix,A × P E . It is known that the quantity is universally composable [28] .
Renner [16] defined the conditional L 2 -distance from uniform of P A,E relative to a distribution Q E on E:
Using this value and a normalized distribution Q E , we can evaluate d 
2) Case of joint normalized distribution: In the remaining part of this subsection, we assume that P A,E is a normalized distribution. The correlation between A and E can be evaluated by the mutual information
By using the uniform distribution P mix,A on A, the mutual information can be modified to
which is called the modified mutual information and satisfies
and
Indeed, the quantity I(A : E|P A,E ) represents the amount of information leaked by E, and the remaining quantity D(P A P mix,A ) describes the difference of the random number A from the uniform random number. So, if the quantity I ′ (A|E|P A,E ) is small, we can conclude that the random number A has less correlation with E and is close to the uniform random number. As shown in Appendix A, when we assume several natural constraints for the security criterion, it is restricted to the modified mutual information I ′ (A|E|P A,E ). In particular, if the quantity I ′ (A|E|P A,E ) goes to zero, the mutual information I(A : E|P A,E ) goes to zero, and the marginal distribution P A goes to the uniform distribution. Hence, we can adopt the quantity I ′ (A|E|P A,E ) as a criterion for qualifying the secret random number.
Using Pinsker inequality, we obtain
Conversely, we can evaluate I(A : E|P A,E ) and I ′ (A|E|P A,E ) by using d 1 (A|E|P A,E ) and d ′ 1 (A|E|P A,E ) in the following way. Applying the Fannes inequality, we obtain
where η(x, y) := −x log x + xy. Similarly, we obtain
III. RANDOM HASH FUNCTIONS
A. General random hash functions
In this section, we focus on a random function f X from A to B, where X is a random variable identifying the function f X . In this case, the total information of Eve's system is written as (E, X). Then, by using P fX(A),E,X (b, e, x) := a∈f −1
Also, the modified mutual information is written as
We say that a random function f X is ε-almost universal 2 [1] , [2] , [14] , if, for any pair of different inputs a 1 ,a 2 , the collision probability of their outputs is upper bounded as
The parameter ε appearing in (44) is shown to be confined in the region
and in particular, a random function f X with ε = 1 is simply called a universal 2 function. Two important examples of universal 2 hash function are the Toeplitz matrices (see, e.g., [3] ), and multiplications over a finite field (see, e.g., [1] , [4] ). A modified form of the Toeplitz matrices is also shown to be universal 2 , which is given by a concatenation (X, I) of the Toeplitz matrix X and the identity matrix I [13] . The (modified) Toeplitz matrices are particularly useful in practice, because there exists an efficient multiplication algorithm using the fast Fourier transform algorithm with complexity O(n log n) (see, e.g., [5] ).
The following proposition holds for any universal 2 function. Proposition 10 (Renner [16, Lemma 5.4.3] ): Given any joint sub-distribution P A,E on A×E and any normalized distribution Q E on E, any universal 2 hash function f X from A to M := {1, . . . , M} satisfies
More precisely, the inequality
holds.
B. Ensemble of linear hash functions
Tsurumaru and Hayashi [14] focus on linear functions over the finite field F 2 . Now, we treat the case of linear functions over a finite field F q , where q is a power of a prime number p. We assume that sets A, B are F n q , F m q respectively with n ≥ m, and f are linear functions over F q . Note that, in this case, there is a kernel C corresponding to a given linear function f , which is a vector space of the dimension n − m or more. Conversely, when given a vector subspace C ⊂ F n q of the dimension n − m or more, we can always construct a linear function
That is, we can always identify a linear hash function f C and a code C. When C X = Ker f X , the definition of ε-universal 2 function (44) takes the form
which is equivalent with
This shows that the kernel C X contains sufficient information for determining if a random function f X is ε-almost universal 2 or not. For a given random code C X , we define its minimum (respectively, maximum) dimension as t min := min X dim C X (respectively, t max := max r∈I dim C X ). Then, we say that a linear random code C X of minimum (or maximum) dimension t is an ε-almost universal 2 code if the following condition is satisfied
In particular, if ε = 1, we call C X a universal 2 code.
C. Dual universality of a random code
Based on Tsurumaru and Hayashi [14] , we define several variations of the universality of a error-correcting random code and the linear function as follows. First, we define the dual random code C ⊥ X of a given linear random code C X as the dual code of C X . We also introduce the notion of dual universality as follows. We say that a random code C X in F n q is ε-almost dual universal 2 with minimum dimension t (with maximum dimension t), if the dual random code C ⊥ X is ε-almost universal 2 with maximum dimension n − t (with minimum dimension n − t). Hence, we say that a linear random function f X from F n q to F m q is ε-almost dual universal 2 , if the kernels C X of f X forms an ε-almost dual universal 2 code with minimum dimension n − m. This condition is equivalent with the condition that the linear space spanned by the generating matrix of f X forms an ε-almost universal 2 random code with maximum dimension m. An explicit example of a dual universal 2 function (with ε = 1) can be given by the modified Toeplitz matrix mentioned earlier [11] , i.e., a concatenation (X, I) of the Toeplitz matrix X and the identity matrix I. The modified Toeplitz matrix requires n − 1 bits of random seeds R. This example is particularly useful in practice because it is both universal 2 and dual universal 2 , and also because there exists an efficient algorithm with complexity O(n log n). When the random variable R is not the uniform random number, the modified Toeplitz matrix is q n−1 e −Hmin(R) -almost dual universal 2 , as shown in [34] . Therefore, we can evaluate the security of the modified Toeplitz matrix even with non-uniform random seeds. With these preliminaries, we can present the following theorem in the non-quantum setting of [ 
14, Corollary 2]:
Proposition 11:
As a special case, we obtain the following.
Corollary 12: Any universal 2 linear random function f X over a finite filed F q is a q-almost dual universal 2 function.
D. δ-biased ensemble
Next, according to Dodis and Smith [9] , we introduce δ-biased ensemble of random variables W X on a vector space over a general finite field F q , where q is the power of the prime p. First, we fix a non-degenerate bilinear form
holds for any x = 0 ∈ F n q , where ω p := e 2πi p . We denote the random variable subject to the uniform distribution on a code C ∈ F n q , by W C . Then,
Using the above relation, as is suggested in [9, Case 2], we obtain the following lemma. Lemma 13: When a random code C X in F n q is ε-almost dual universal with minimum dimension t, the ensemble of random variables W CX in F n q is εq −t -biased. Proof: C ⊥ X is ε-almost universal with maximum dimension n−t in F n q . Hence, for any x ∈ F n q , the probability Pr{x ∈ C ⊥ X } is less than εq −t . Thus, (53) guarantees that the ensemble of random variables W CX in F n q is εq −t -biased. In the following, we treat the case of A = F n q . Given a joint sub-distribution P A,E on A × E and a normalized distribution P W on A, we define another joint sub-distribution P A,E * P W (a, e) := w P W (w)P A,E (a − w, e). Using these concepts, Dodis and Smith [9] evaluated the average of d 2 (A|E|P A,E * P WX Q E ) as follows.
Proposition 14 ([9, Lemma 4]):
For any joint sub-distribution P A,E on A × E and any normalized distribution Q E on E, a δ-biased ensemble of random variables {W X } on A = F n q satisfies
More precisely,
The original proof by Dodis and Smith [9] discussed in the case with q = 2. Fehr and Schaffner [10] extended this lemma to the quantum setting in the case with q = 2. Their proof is based on Fourier analysis and easy to understand. The proof with a general prime power q is given in Appendix G by generalizing the idea by Fehr and Schaffner [10] . Dodis and Smith[9, Lemma 6] also considered the case with a general prime power q. They did not explicitly give Proposition 14 and the definition (52) with the general case.
Lemma 15: Given a joint sub-distribution P A,E on A × E and a normalized distribution Q E on E. When C X is an ε-almost dual universal 2 code with minimum dimension t, the random hash function f CX satisfies
In other words, an ε-almost dual universal 2 function f X from F n 2 to F n−t 2 satisfies (56) and (57). Lemma 15 essentially coincides with Proposition 14. However, the concept "δ-biased" does not concern a linear random hash function while the concept "ε-almost dual universality 2 " does it because the former is defined for the ensemble of random variables. That is, the latter is a generalization of a universal 2 linear hash function while the former does not. Hence, Proposition 14 cannot directly provide the performance of a linear random hash function. In contrast, Lemma 15 gives how the privacy amplification by a linear hash function decreases the leaked information. Therefore, in the following section, using Lemma 15 we treat the exponential decreasing rate when we apply the privacy amplification by an ε-almost dual universal 2 linear hash function.
Proof: Due to Lemma 13 and (54), we obtain
Denoting the quotient class with respect to the subspace C with the representative a ∈ A by [a], we obtain
Now, we focus on the relation
Thus,
Therefore, (58) implies
which implies (56) . Similarly, Lemma 13, (55) , and (59) imply that
, we have (57).
IV. SECURITY BOUNDS WITH RÉNYI ENTROPY OF ORDER 2 AND MIN ENTROPY
Firstly, we consider the secure key generation problem from a common random number A ∈ A which has been partially eavesdropped as an information by Eve. For this problem, it is assumed that Alice and Bob share a common random number A ∈ A, and Eve has a random number E correlated with the random number A, whose distribution is P E . The task is to extract a common random number f (A) from the random number A ∈ A, which is almost independent of Eve's quantum state. Here, Alice and Bob are only allowed to apply the same function f to the common random number A ∈ A. Now, we focus on the random function f X from A to M = {1, . . . , M}, where X denotes a random variable describing the stochastic behavior of the function f X .
Renner
Further, the inequalities used in proof of Renner [16, Corollary 5.6 .1] imply that
Applying the same discussion to Shannon entropy, we can evaluate the average of the modified mutual information criterion by using E X d 2 (f X (A)|E|P A,E Q E ) as follows.
Lemma 17: Assume that P A,E is a normalized distribution on A × E. Any random hash function f X from A to M = {1, . . . , M} satisfies
Further, when a sub-distribution P ′ A,E satisfies P ′ E (e) ≤ P E (e) for any e ∈ E (we simplify this condition to P ′ E ≤ P E ), we obtain
where η(x, y) := xy − x log x. Proof: The inequality ψ(1|P ′ E P E ) ≤ 0 holds due to the condition P ′ E (e) ≤ P E (e). Since
we have
Taking the logarithm, we obtain
Substituting
Since the function x → log(1 + x) is concave, we obtain
which implies (60) . The inequality log(1 + x) ≤ x and (60) yield (61) . Due to Fannes inequality, the normalized distribution P A|E=e (a) :=
PA,E (a,e) PE (e) and the sub-distribution
Since e P E (e) P A|E=e − P
Therefore, using (67) and (65), we obtain
Taking the expectation of X and using the concavity of functions x → η(x, log M) and x → log(1 + x), we obtain (62) . The inequality log(1 + x) ≤ x yields (63) . In this proof, the condition P E (e) ′ ≤ P E (e) is crucial because Inequality (64) cannot be shown without this condition. Now, we evaluate the security by combining Lemmas 15, 16, and 17 . For this purpose, we introduce the quantities:
Note that
2 (A|E|P A,E ) has additional constraints for P ′ A,E . Then, we can evaluate the averages of both security criteria under the ε-almost dual universal 2 condition. Theorem 18: Assume that Q E is a normalized distribution on E, P A,E is a sub-distribution on A × E, and a linear random hash function f X from A to M = {1, . . . , M} is ε-almost dual universal 2 . Then, the random hash function f X satisfies
When P A,E is a normalized joint distribution, it satisfies
While the same evaluations for the L 1 distinguishability criterion under the universal 2 condition has been shown in Renner[16, Corollary 5.6.1], those for the modified mutual information criterion have not been shown even under the universal 2 condition. All of the above evaluations under the ǫ-almost dual universal 2 condition have not been discussed in Renner. Since the function x → η(x, y) is concave, combing Inequality (41), we obtain the following corollary. Corollary 19: When a linear random hash function f X from A to M = {1, . . . , M } is ε-almost dual universal 2 , any joint sub-distribution P A,E on A and E satisfies
for s ∈ (0, 1/2]. Since the function x → √ x is concave, combing Inequality (39), we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 20: When a linear random hash function f X from A to M = {1, . . . , M} is ε-almost dual universal 2 , any joint normalized distribution P A,E on A × E satisfy 
Renner [16] introduced ǫ 1 -smooth min entropy as
For the evaluation of E X I ′ (f X (A)|E|P A,E ), adding the condition P ′ E ≤ P E , we define
As
we obtain the following lemma. Theorem 21: Assume that Q E is a normalized distribution on E, P A,E is a sub-distribution on A × E, and a linear random hash function f X from A to M = {1, . . . , M} is ε-almost dual universal 2 . Then, the random hash function f X satisfies
That is, ∆ d,min (M, ε|P A,E ) and ∆ I,min (M, ε|P A,E ) are upper bounds for leaked information in the respective criteria when the rigorous smoothing of min entropy is applied.
V. RELATION WITH INFORMATION SPECTRUM
Information spectrum can derive asymptotically tight bounds of the optimal performances of various information processings by using only the asymptotic behavior of the tail probability, e.g., P A,E {(a, e)|P A|E (a|e) ≥ e −R }. Hence, it can be applied without any assumption for information sources. While information spectrum originally addresses the asymptotic setting, we bound the performances in the single-shot setting by using the tail probability. We call these upper and lower bounds single-shot information spectrum bounds.
In this section, we clarify the relation between the rigorous smoothing of min entropy and single-shot information spectrum bounds. While the rigorous smoothing of min entropy employs the smooth min entropy H ǫ1 min (A|E|P A,E ), we consider the bounds ∆ d,min (M, ε|P A,E ) and ∆ I,min (M, ε|P A,E ) as functions of
That is, we employ the formulas (79) and (82) rather than (78) and (81). Then, we give their relations with the tail probability, e.g., P A,E {(a, e)|P A|E (a|e) ≥ e −R } as follows. Lemma 22:
for c > 1 and R. Since the condition P ′ A,E ≤ P A,E is more restrictive than P
The optimal sub-distribution P ′ A,E in the first line of (85) is given as
The sub-distribution is the optimal sub-distribution in the second line of (85). Substituting the above sub-distribution in to the first line, we obtain the third line of (85).
Next
where the inequality (88) follows from the fact that the maximum max Ω P A,E (Ω) − e −R |A|P mix,A × Q E (Ω) can be realized by the set {(a, e)|P A,E (a, e) > e −R Q E (e)}. Therefore, using the formulas (79) and (82), we obtain the following theorem. Theorem 23: The upper bounds ∆ d,min (M, ε|P A,E ) and ∆ I,min (M, ε|P A,E ) of leaked information by the rigorous smoothing of min entropy can be evaluated as follows.
for c > 1. Theorem 23 explains that the bounds ∆ d,min (M, ε|P A,E ) and ∆ I,min (M, ε|P A,E ) by the rigorous smoothing of min entropy have almost the same values as the single-shot information spectrum bounds. Using this characterization, we evaluate the bounds ∆ d,min (M, ε|P A,E ) and ∆ I,min (M, ε|P A,E ) in the latter sections. However, the bounds by the rigorous smoothing of Rényi entropy of order 2 can not be characterized in the same way. This fact seems to indicate the possibility of the smoothing of Rényi entropy of order 2 beyond the rigorous smoothing of min entropy.
VI. SECRET KEY GENERATION WITH NO ERROR: SINGLE-SHOT CASE
In order to obtain useful upper bounds, we need to calculate or evaluate the quantities
1/2 , and ∆ I,max (M, ε|P A,E ) 1/2 . We say that their exact value is the rigorous smoothing and upper bounds by non-optimal choice P ′ are approximate smoothing. The paper [12] gave a suitable approximate smoothing of Rényi entropy of order 2 and derived the following proposition.
Proposition 24: The inequality
Using the same approximate smoothing, we obtain the following evaluation. Lemma 25: The inequality
Applying a similar approximate smoothing to Theorem 18, we obtain an upper bound for ∆ I,2 (M, ε|P A,E ). Theorem 26: The inequality
holds for s ∈ (0, 1].
Proof: For any integer M, we choose the subset Ω M := {P A|E (a|e) > M −1 }, and define the sub-distribution P A,E:M by
Substituting (96) and (97) into (72), we obtain (74) because
In the above proof, we choose P ′ A,E to be P A,E:M (a, e), we call the approximate smoothing by this particular choice the information-spectrum-smoothing because this type smoothing is used to derive the entropic information spectrum in [17] . Indeed, the paper [12] also employed the information-spectrum-smoothing to derive Proposition 24.
Further, ∆ d,min (M, ε|P A,E ) and ∆ I,min (M, ε|P A,E ) can be evaluated as follows. Theorem 27: The upper bounds ∆ d,min (M, ε|P A,E ) and ∆ I,min (M, ε|P A,E ) of leaked information by the rigorous smoothing of min entropy can be evaluated as follows.
(98)
Theorem 27 gives upper bounds on ∆ d,min (M, ε|P A,E ) and ∆ I,min (M, ε|P A,E ). The combination of Theorems 23 and 27 shows the performance of the rigorous smoothing of min entropy. Using these bounds, we can show the tight exponential decreasing rates of ∆ d,min (M, ε|P A,E ) and ∆ I,min (M, ε|P A,E ).
Proof: Since
≤ (a,e):
, we have , we have , ε + log M).
Since the above inequality holds for s ≥ 0, we have , ε + log M),
Hence, combining (92), we obtain (99).
Remark 2:
Here, we compare the calculation amount of obtained bounds in Sections IV, V, and VI. In order to calculate the bounds ∆ d,2 (M, ε|P A,E ), ∆ I,2 (M, ε|P A,E ), ∆ d,min (M, ε|P A,E ), and ∆ I,min (M, ε|P A,E ) based on rigorous smoothing, we need calculate the smooth entropies, which contains several optimization. Hence, the calculation of these bounds requires at least double optimization process. Then, they need higher calculation amounts. In particular, if the block size becomes larger, their calculation amounts increase heavily.
The bounds given in Section V are calculated from the tail probability. For example, the tail probability P A,E {(a, e)|P A|E (a|e) > e −R ′ } can be characterized as the tail probability with respect to the random variable log P A|E (a|e) because P A,E {(a, e)|P A|E (a|e) > e −R ′ } = P A,E {(a, e)| log P A|E (a|e) > −R ′ }. Hence, in the i.i.d. case, this probability can be calculated by using statistical packages. While the calculation amount increases with a rise in the block size, it is not as large as the above cases because statistical packages can be used.
The calculation amounts of the bounds given in Section VI are quite small. In particular, in the i.i.d. case, the calculation amounts do not depend on the block size. These bounds have great advantages with respect to their calculation amounts.
VII. SECRET KEY GENERATION WITH NO ERROR: ASYMPTOTIC CASE
Next, we consider the case when the information source is given by the n-fold independent and identical distribution P n A,E of P A,E , i.e., P An,En = P n A,E . In this case, Ahlswede and Csiszár [7] showed that the optimal generation rate
equals the conditional entropy H(A|E), where f n is a function from A n to {1, . . . , M n }. That is, when the generation rate R = lim n→∞ log Mn n is smaller than H(A|E), the quantity d
A,E ) goes to zero. In order to treat the speed of this convergence, we focus on the supremum of the exponential rate of decrease (exponent) for d
Due to (41), when d
A,E ) goes to zero. Conversely, due to (39), when
A,E ) goes to zero. So, even if we replace the security criterion by
A,E ), the optimal generation rate does not change. Now, we consider the case when the length of generated keys behaves as nH(
Then, using Theorem 27, we obtain the following theorem. Theorem 28: We choose a polynomial P (n). When a random linear function f X n from A n to {1, . . . , ⌊e nH(A|E|P )+ √ nR ⌋} is P (n)-almost dual universal 2 , the relations
hold, where we take the minimum under the condition that f is a function from A n to {1, . . . , ⌊e nH(A|E|P )+ √ nR ⌋} and V (P ) := a,e P A,E (a, e)(log P A|E (a|e) − H(A|E|P ))
2 . Lemma 28 implies that any P (n)-almost dual universal 2 hash function realizes the optimality in the sense of the second order asymptotics when we employ the L 1 distinguishability criterion. This analysis is obtained from our approximate smoothing of min entropy. That is, this analysis does not require an approximate smoothing of Rényi entropy of order 2. The second order analysis with the mutual information criterion is not so easy. We do not treat this issue.
Proof: We applying (90) in Theorem 23 with R ′ = nH(A|E|P )+ √ nR+ n 1/4 . Then, the central limit theorem guarantees that
A,E ), combining (101), we obtain (102). Now, we proceed to the exponential decreasing rate when we choose the key generation rate R is greater than H(A|E|P ). Since the discussion for the exponential decreasing rate is more complex, more delicate treatment is required. First, we should remark that the exponential decreasing rate depends on the choice of the security criterion. Then, we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 29: We choose a polynomial P (n). When a linear random function f X n from A n to {1, . . . , ⌊e nR ⌋} is P (n)-almost dual universal 2 , the relations
hold, where
Proof: (103) can be shown by Theorem 25. (104) can be shown by Theorem 26. As is shown in Appendix E-A, the following relation between two exponents e H (P A,E |R) and e G (P A,E |R) holds. Lemma 30: we obtain 1 2 e H (P A,E |R) ≤e G (P A,E |R)
e H (P A,E |R) ≥e G (P A,E |R).
First, we consider the tightness of Inequality (103). Corollary 20 yields the exponent
for the L 1 distinguishability criterion. Lemma 30 shows that the exponents by Theorem 25 is better than that by Corollary 20. Further, it is also shown in [38, Theorem 30] that there exists a sequence of universal 2 functions f X n from A n to {1, . . . , ⌊e nR ⌋} such that
whereē
When the maximum max 0≤t t(H
n A,E ), combining (93), (103), and (109) we have
That is, our evaluation (103) for ∆ d,2 (e nR , P (n)|P n A,E ) is sufficiently tight in the large deviation sense. Next, we consider the tightness of Inequality (104). Corollary 19 yields the exponent e G (P A,E |R) for the modified mutual information criterion. Lemma 30 shows that the exponent by Theorem 26 is better than that by Corollary 19. Further, the lower bound of the exponent e G (P A,E |R) is the same as that given in the previous paper [13] under the universal 2 condition. Since the bound given in [13] is the best lower bound of the exponent, our evaluation (104) for ∆ I,2 (e nR , P (n)|P n A,E ) is as good as the existing evaluation [13] in the large deviation sense.
From the above discussion, we find that the exponents directly obtained by our approximate smoothing of Rényi entropy of order 2 are better than the exponents derived from the combination of Inequality (39)/(41) and the exponent of the other criterion. This fact indicates that we need to choose our approximate smoothing dependently of the security criterion.
Remark 3: Now, we consider the relation with the recent paper [27] discussing the quantum case as including the nonquantum case. When A = F q , we focus on a 1 + P (n)q −n+⌊nR⌋ -almost universal 2 surjective linear function f X n over the field
. Thanks to Proposition 11, the surjective linear random function f X n over the field F q is q + P (n)-almost dual universal 2 . Hence, we obtain (103), which can recover a part of the result by [27] with the case of linear functions in the non-quantum case. The paper [27] showed the security with an ǫ n -almost universal 2 hash function when ǫ n approaches to 1. Since we assume the surjectivity, our method cannot recover the result by [27] with the linear hash function perfectly. Now, we clarify how better our smoothing of Rényi entropy of order 2 is than the rigorous smoothing of min entropy. As is shown in Appendix F, we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 31: The relations
hold. For comparison the exponents by the rigorous smoothing of min entropy and our approximate smoothing of Rényi entropy of order 2, as is shown in Appendix E-B, we have the following lemma by using Theorem 27.
Lemma 32: The inequalities
hold when P A|E=e is not a uniform distribution for an element e ∈ E. The equalities e G (P A,E |R) =ẽ G (P A,E |R) and e H (P A,E |R) =ẽ H (P A,E |R) hold when P A|E=e is a uniform distribution for any element e ∈ E. Theorem 31 and Lemma 32 show that the rigorous smoothing of min entropy cannot attain the exponents e G (P A,E |R) and e H (P A,E |R). That is, the bounds ∆ d,2 (e nR , ε|P In summary, while a smoothing of min entropy yields the tight bound in the sense of the second order asymptotics, the rigorous smoothing of min entropy cannot yield the tight bound in the sense of the exponential decreasing rate.
Remark 4: Here, we give the relation with the results in the quantum case [57] . The paper [57] showed that
The RHSs of (116) and (117) are smaller than e G (P A,E |R) and e H (P A,E |R), respectively. Hence, our result is better in the non-quantum case.
VIII. EQUIVOCATION RATE OF SECRET KEY GENERATION WITHOUT ERROR CORRECTION
When the key generation rate R is larger than the conditional entropy H(A|E|P A,E ), the leaked information does not go to zero. In this case, it is natural to consider the rate of the conditional entropy rate of generated keys or the rate of the modified mutual information [31] . The former rate is called the equivocation rate, and is known to be less than the conditional entropy H(A|E|P A,E ) [31] . That is, the rate of the modified mutual information is larger than R − H(A|E|P A,E ). Now, we show that the minimum rate of the modified mutual information R − H(A|E|P A,E ) can be achieved by an ε-almost dual universal 2 hash function. For this purpose, we employ (62) instead of (63) . Then, we obtain a slightly stronger evaluation than Theorem 21.
Theorem 33: Assume that Q E is a normalized distribution on E, P A,E is a sub-distribution on A × E, and a linear random hash function f X from A to M = {1, . . . , M} is ε-almost dual universal 2 . Then, the random hash function f X satisfies
where
= min
Further, by using similar discussions as Sections V and VI, the upper bound ∆ I,min (M, ε|P A,E |P A,E ) can be evaluated as follows.
Theorem 34:
Proof: Inequality (122) follows from Lemma 22 and (121). Inequality (123) follows from (100) with Q E = P E . Now, we consider the asymptotic behavior of ∆ I,min (⌈e nR ⌉, ε|P n A,E ). Theorem 35: Any polynomial P (n) satisfies
for R ≥ H(A|E|P A,E ). Theorem 35 shows that ε-almost dual universal 2 hash functions realize the asymptotically optimal performance in the sense of equivocation rate. Further, Theorem 35 clarifies that our approximate smoothing of min entropy yields the optimal evaluation in the sense of equivocation rate.
Proof: It is known by [31] that any sequence of hash function from A to {1, . . . , ⌈e nR ⌉} satisfies
Hence, it is enough to show that
We choose R ′ < H(A|E|P A,E ). Relation (123) implies that
Since R ′ < H(A|E|P A,E ), the value min s≥0 e sn(R ′ −H1+s(A|E|PA,E) goes to zero exponentially. Hence, the term 1 n η(min s≥0 e sn(R ′ −H1+s(A|E|PA,E ) , nR) goes to zero. Since
Since R ′ is an arbitrary real number satisfying R ′ < H(A|E|P A,E ), we obtain (126).
IX. SECRET KEY GENERATION WITH ERROR CORRECTION
A. Protocol
Next, we apply the above discussions to secret key generation with public communication. Alice is assumed to have an initial random variable a ∈ A, which generates with the probability p a , and Bob and Eve are assumed to have their random variables B ∈ B and E ∈ E, respectively (or initial quantum states ρ B|a and ρ E|a on their quantum systems H B and H E , respectively.) The task for Alice and Bob is to share a common random variable almost independent of Eve's quantum state by using a public communication. The quality is evaluated by three quantities: the size of the final common random variable, the probability of the disagreement of their final variables (error probability), and the information leaked to Eve, which can be quantified by the L 1 distinguishability criterion or the modified mutual information criterion between Alice's final variables and Eve's random variable.
In order to construct a protocol for this task, we assume that the set A is a vector space on a finite field F q . Indeed, even if the cardinality |A| is not a prime power, it become a prime power by adding elements with zero probability. Hence, we can assume that the cardinality |A| is a prime power q without loss of generality. Then, the secret key agreement can be realized by the following two steps: The first is the error correction, and the second is the privacy amplification. In the error correction, Alice and Bob prepare a linear subspace C 1 ⊂ A and the representatives a(x) of all cosets x ∈ A/C 1 . Alice sends the coset information [A] ∈ A/C 1 to Bob in stead of her random variable A ∈ A, and Bob obtain his estimateÂ of A ∈ A from his random variable B ∈ B (or his quantum state on H B ) and [A] ∈ A/C 1 . Alice obtains her random variable
, and Bob obtains his random variableÂ 1 :=Â − a([B]) ∈ C 1 . In the privacy amplification, Alice and Bob prepare a common hash function f on C 1 . Then, applying the hash function f to the their variables A 1 andÂ 1 , they obtain their final random variables f (A 1 ) and f (Â 1 ).
Indeed, the above protocol depends on the choice of estimator that gives the estimateÂ from [A] ∈ A/C 1 and his random variable B ∈ B (or his quantum state on H B ). In the remaining part of this section, we give the estimator depending on the setting and discuss the performance of this protocol.
B. Error probability
In the following, we give the concrete form of the estimator and evaluate the error probability. In this case, we apply the Bayesian decoder, which is given asÂ
In this case, the error probability is characterized as follows.
Thus, the error probability P e [P A,B , C 1 ] can be evaluated as
Now, we randomly choose the code C 1 as an ε-almost universal 2 code C X with the dimension t. Then,
.
(129)
C. Leaked information with fixed error correction code
As is mentioned in the previous sections, we have two criteria for quality of secret random variables. Given a code C 1 ⊂ A and a hash function f , the first criterion is d
, and the second criterion is
. Note that the random variable A can be written by the pair of A 1 and [A] given in Subsection IX-A. Then, we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 36: Assume that f X is an ε-almost dual universal 2 hash function from A/C 1 to M = {1, . . . , M }. The relations
hold for s ∈ (0, 1/2] and s ′ ∈ (0, 1], where L is the the amount of sacrifice information |C 1 |/M. Proof: Proposition 24 and (27) with s = t 1+t guarantee that
, which implies (130). Proposition 24, Lemma 6, and (27) with s ′ = t 1+t guarantee that
which implies (131).
D. Leaked information with randomized error correction code
Next, we evaluate leaked information when the error correcting code C 1 is chosen as an ǫ 1 -almost universal 2 code. In this case, the evaluation for the average of the modified mutual information criterion can be improved to the following way.
Theorem 37: We choose the code C 1 as an ǫ 1 -almost universal 2 code C X with the dimension t. Assume that f Y is an ǫ 2 -almost dual universal 2 hash function from A/C X to M = {1, . . . , M}, the random variables X and Y are independent, and ǫ 2 ≥ 1.
for s ∈ (0, 1]. Proof: We choose a joint sub-distribution P ′
A,E such that P ′ A,E (a, e) ≤ P A,E (a, e). Due to (57), we obtain
where the first inequality follows from ǫ 2 ≥ 1. Hence, we obtain
Applying Jensen's inequality to x → log x, we obtain
Using (66), (17), and Lemma 8, we obtain
Hence, we obtain
Applying the same discussion as the proof of Theorem 26, we obtain
E. Asymptotic analysis
Next, we consider the case when the joint distribution is given as the n-fold independent and identical distribution P n A,B,E of a distribution P A,B,E , where A is F q . In this setting, we can treat the error probability and the leaked information separately. Now, we fix a code C 1,n in F n q with the dimension ⌊n R1 log q ⌋. Theorem 38: Let P (n) be an arbitrary polynomial. When f X is a P (n)-almost dual universal 2 hash function from
hold. Proof: (130) and (131) yield the above inequality. Hence, due to (29) , when R 1 ≤ log q − H(A|B|P A,B ), the error probability goes to zero exponentially. Similarly, when R 2 ≥ log q − H(A|E|P A,E ), the leaked information goes to zero exponentially in both criteria. In the above case, the key generation rate R 1 − R 2 is less than H (A|E|P A,E ) − H(A|B|P A,B ) . This value is already obtained by Ahlswede & Csiszár [7] , Maurer [6] .
Next, we consider the case when the error correcting code is chosen randomly. In this case, the exponential decreasing rate for
A,E ) can be improved as follows. Theorem 39: For an arbitrary polynomial P (n) and the independent random variables X, Y, we assume that the random code C X with the dimension ⌊n R1 log q ⌋ is universal 2 and f Y is a P (n)-almost dual universal 2 hash function from
, the relations (138) and
hold.
Proof: Theorem 37 implies (141). Since C Xn is a universal 2 code in F n q with the dimension ⌊n
R1
log q ⌋, due to (129), the error probability can be bounded as
for s ∈ [0, 1], which implies (140).
Remark 5: The RHS of (138) in Theorem 38 is the same as the exponent of [12, (66) ]. The RHS of (141) in Theorem 39 is the same as the exponent of [13, (28) ]. However, the codes of Theorems 38 and 39 are essentially different from those given in [13] , [12] because the condition of hash functions in Theorems 38 and 39 is weaker than the universal 2 condition, which is essentially employed in [13] , [12] . That is, Theorems 38 and 39 require only P (n)-almost dual universal 2 hash function.
Further, the RHS of (141) in Theorem 39 is better than the RHS of (139). However, the protocol considered in (141) in Theorem 39 is different from that in (139) in Theorem 38. We have to randomize the code C 1 for (141) in Theorem 39, while the bound (139) in Theorem 38 is obtained with a fixed code C 1 .
X. SIMPLE EXAMPLE
As a simple example, we assume that A = B = E = F p and for two distributions P X and P ′ X are given on X = F p , the joint distribution is given as
Then,
and e −sH1+s(A|E|PA,E ) =e
Hence, e G (P A,E |R) and e H (P A,E |R) are simplified to
Similarly, we obtain
Now, we choose the rate R 1 of size of code C 1 . When C Xn is the P (n)-almost universal 2 code in F n p with the dimension ⌊n R1 log p ⌋, due to (129), the error probability can be bounded as
That is,
On the other hand, since e H (P A,E |R) > e G (P A,E |R) due to (144) and (145), the randomization of error correcting code improves the evaluation of the quantity
The difference between e H (P A,E |R) and e G (P A,E |R) is numerically evaluated in Fig 1. 
XI. CONCLUSION
We have derived upper bounds for the leaked information in the modified mutual information criterion and the L 1 distinguishability criterion when we apply an ε-almost dual universal 2 hash function for privacy amplification. (Theorems 26 and 25 in Section VI). Then, we have derived lower bounds on their exponential decreasing rates in the i.i.d. setting. (Theorem 29 in Section VII). We have also applied our result to the case when we need error correction. In this case, we apply the privacy amplification after error correction as given in Subsection IX-A. Then, we have derived upper bounds for the information leaked with respect to the final keys in the respective criteria as well as upper bounds for the probability for disagreement in the final keys (Theorems 36 and 37 in Section IX). Applying them to the i.i.d. setting, we have derived lower bounds on their exponential decreasing rates. (Theorems 38 and 39 in Section IX).
We have rigorously compared the exponents by the rigorous smoothing of min-entropy and our approximate smoothing of Rényi entropy of order 2. That is, we have clarified the upper bounds of leaked information via the rigorous smoothing of min-entropy in the both criteria. That is, we have compared ∆ d,2 (M, ε|P A,E ) and ∆ d,min (M, ε|P A,E ) for Rényi entropy of order 2, and have done ∆ I,2 (M, ε|P A,E ) and ∆ I,min (M, ε|P A,E ) for modified mutual information criterion. We have derived the exponents of the upper bounds (Theorem 31 in Section VI), and have shown that the exponents are strictly worse than the exponents by our approximate smoothing of Rényi entropy of order 2 (Lemma 32 in Section VI). This fact shows the importance of an approximate smoothing of Rényi entropy of order 2. The obtained exponents are summarized in Table II. Due to Pinsker inequality and Inequality (41), the exponential convergence of one criterion yields the exponential convergence of the other criterion. However, we have shown that better exponential decreasing rates can be obtained by separate derivations. For example, our approximate smoothing of Rényi entropy of order 2 yields the exponent e G (P A,E |R) for the L 1 distinguishability criterion, which yields the exponent e G (P A,E |R) for the modified mutual information criterion by using Pinsker inequality. Similarly, our approximate smoothing of Rényi entropy of order 2 yields the exponent e H (P A,E |R) for the modified mutual information criterion, which yields the exponent
for the L 1 distinguishability criterion by Inequality (41) . Since e G (P A,E |R) ≥ eH (PA,E |R) 2
and e H (P A,E |R) ≥ e G (P A,E |R), the exponents directly derived by our approximate smoothing of Rényi entropy of order 2 are better than the exponents derived from the combination of the exponent for the other criterion and the inequality.
We have also shown that the application of ε-almost dual universal hash function attains the asymptotically optimal performance in the sense of the second order asymptotics as well as in that of the asymptotic equivocation rate. These 
R is the key generation rate. R 2 is the sacrifice rate. PV is the exponent for privacy amplification via our approximate smoothing of Rényi entropy of order 2. PV (smooth min) is the exponent for privacy amplification via the rigorous smoothing of min entropy. EC is error correction. L2 is the L 1 distinguishability criterion. MMI is the modified mutual information criterion.
facts have been shown by using the approximate smoothing of min entropy. We can conclude that ε-almost dual universal hash functions are very a useful class of hash functions. Further, these discussions show that the approximate smoothing of min entropy is sufficiently powerful except for the exponential decreasing rate. That is, the exponential decreasing rate requires more delicate evaluation than other settings. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The author is grateful to Dr. Toyohiro Tsurumaru, Dr. Shun Watanabe, Dr. Marco Tomamichel, Dr. Mario Berta, Dr. William Henry Rosgen, Dr. Li Ke, and Dr. Markus Grassl for a helpful comments. He is also grateful to the referee of the first version of [14] for informing the literatures [9] , [10] . 
C2
Linearity When the supports of two marginal distributions P E,1 and P E,2 are disjoint as subsets of E, C(
Normalization C(A|E||a a| ⊗ P E ) = log |A|. Unfortunately, the L 1 distinguishability does not satisfies C1 Chain rule. However, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 40: C(A|E|P ) satisfies all of the above properties if and only if C(A|E|P ) coincides with the modified mutual information criterion I ′ (A|E|P ) = log |A| − H(A|E|P ). Hence, it is natural to adopt the modified mutual information criterion I ′ (A|E|P ) as a security criterion. In particular, if one emphasizes C1 Chain rule rather than the universal composability, it is better employ the modified mutual information criterion I ′ (A|E|P ).
Proof of Theorem 40:
First, we show that the modified mutual information criterion I ′ (A|E|P ) = log |A| − H(A|E|P ) satisfies all of the above conditions. We can trivially check the conditions C4 Ideal case and C5 Normalization. We show other conditions. C1 Chain rule can be shown as follows. When two marginal distributions P E,1 and P E,2 are distinghuishable on E,
′ (A|E|P ) satisfies all of the above properties. Next, we show that an quantity satisfying all of the above properties is the modified mutual information criterion I ′ (A|E|P ) = log |A| − H(A|E|P ). For this purpose, we focus onH(A|E|P ) := log |A| − C(A|E|P ). Due to C1 Linearity, we havẽ
Further, we see that the quantityH(A|E|P A|E=e ) satisfies Khinchin's axioms [56] for entropy because of the remaining properties. Hence, we find thatH(A|E|P A|E=e ) = H(P A|E=e ). Thus,H(A|E|P ) is equal to the conditional entropy H(A|E|P ). Hence, C(A|E|P ) = I ′ (A|E|P ).
APPENDIX B PROOF OF LEMMA 6
For s ∈ (0, 1] and two functions X(a) and Y (a), the Hölder inequality
holds. The equality holds only when X(a) is a constant times of Y (a). Substituting P A,E (a, e) and (
PA,E (a,e)
PE (e) ) s to X(a) and Y (a), we obtain e −sH1+s(A|E|PA,E) = e a P A,E (a, e)( P A,E (a, e) P E (e) )
for s ∈ (0, 1] because a PA,E (a,e) P E,normal (e) = PE (e) P E,normal (e) ≤ 1. The equality condition holds only when P A|E=e is uniform distribution for all e ∈ E.
For s ∈ [−1, 0) and two functions X(a) and Y (a), the reverse Hölder inequality [35] 
holds. The same substitution yields
P E,normal (e) ) s ≥ 1. The equality condition holds only when P A|E=e is uniform distribution for all e ∈ E. APPENDIX C PROOF OF LEMMA 7 For two non-negative functions X(e) and Y (e), the reverse Hölder inequality [35] for s ∈ (0, ∞]. Since the equality holds when Q E (e) = ( a P A,E (a, e) 1+s ) 1/(1+s) / e ( a P A,E (a, e) 1+s ) for s ∈ [−1, 0). Hence, similarly we obtain (26) with s ∈ [−1, 0).
APPENDIX D PROOF OF LEMMA 9
Lemma 41:
Hence, when we regard H G 1 (A|E|P A,E ) as H(A|E|P A,E ) and P A|E=e is not a uniform distribution for an element e ∈ E, the function s → −sH Then, dϕ(s) ds
we obtain (147). 
which implies (148).
APPENDIX E PROOFS OF COMPARISONS OF EXPONENTS
A. Proof of Lemma 30
Inequality (108) can be shown from (25) . Lemma 7 yields that 1 2 e H (P A,E |R)
=e G (P A,E |R), where t = s 1+s , i.e., s = t 1−t . Inequality (149) follows from the non-negativity of the RHS of (149) and the inequality 
B. Proof of Lemma 32
Lemma 9 implies that
which implies (114). Similarly, since H 1+t (A|E|P A,E ) is strictly monotonically increasing with respect to t,
which implies (115).
When P A|E=e is a uniform distribution for any element e ∈ E, H 1+t (A|E|P A,E ) and H G 1+t (A|E|P A,E ) do not depend on t. Hence, we obtain max 0≤s
and max 0≤s sH1+s(A|E|PA,E)−sR 1+s = max 0≤t≤1 tH 1+t (A|E|P A,E ) − tR = H(A|E|P A,E ) − R, which imply the equalities e G (P A,E |R) =ẽ G (P A,E |R) and e H (P A,E |R) =ẽ H (P A,E |R).
APPENDIX F RIGOROUS SMOOTHING OF MIN ENTROPY
A. Proof of (113) of Theorem 31
First, ∆ I,min (e nR , ε|P n A,E ) is the upper bound by the rigorous smoothing of min entropy in the modified mutual information criterion as is mentioned in (84). Using the relation (99) in Theorem 27, we obtain
Now, we show the opposite inequality. Applying the Cramér Theorem [36] , we obtain
Since sH 1+s (A|E|P A,E ) − sR ′ is monotone decreasing with respect to R ′ and R ′ − R is monotone increasing with respect to R ′ , we have
because the solution of sH 1+s (A|E|P A,E ) − sR
. Using the lower bound (91) in Theorem 23 with c = 2, (151), and (152), we have
Hence, we obtain (113).
B. Proof of (112) of Theorem 31
The quantity ∆ 
We show the opposite inequality in (112) by using the following lemma. The proof of Lemma 42 will be shown latter. 
Using (155) A,E {(a, e) ∈ A n × E n | P n A,E (a, e) Q E,n (e) ≥ 2e
−nR
Further, sH Hence, we obtain (112).
Proof of Lemma 42:
We show Lemma 42 by using Lemmas 43 and 45, which will be given latter. For any distribution Q E,n , we define the permutation invariant distribution Q E,n,inv by Q E,n,inv (e) := g∈Sn 1 n! Q E,n (g(e)), where S n is the n-th permutation group and g(e) is the element permuted from e ∈ E n by g ∈ S n . Then, we have P n A,E {(a, e) ∈ A n × E n | P n A,E (a, e) Q E,n (e) ≥ 2e
A,E {(a, e) ∈ A n × E n |P n A,E (a, e) ≥ 2e
−nR
′ Q E,n (e)} ≥ 1 2 P n A,E {(a, e) ∈ A n × E n |P n A,E (a, e) ≥ 4e
′ Q E,n,inv (e)} = 1 2 P n A,E {(a, e) ∈ A n × E n | P n A,E (a, e) Q E,n,inv (e) ≥ 4e
where the inequality follows from Lemma 43. Here, we denote the set of types of E by T n,E . For any element Q E ∈ T n,E , we denote the uniform distribution over the subset of elements whose type is Q E byQ E . Now, we define the distribution Q E,n,inv,mix (e) := 1 |T n,E | QE ∈Tn,EQ E (e).
Since Q E,n,inv (e) ≤ |T n,E |Q E,n,inv,mix (e), we have 1 2 P n A,E {(a, e) ∈ A n × E n |P n A,E (a, e) ≥ 4e
′ Q E,n,inv (e)} ≥ 1 2 P n A,E {(a, e) ∈ A n × E n |P n A,E (a, e) ≥ 4|T n,E |e
′ Q E,n,inv,mix (e)}.
For given sequence (a, e) ∈ A× E, we denote the type of (a, e) by P ′ A,E and its marginal distribution over E of P ′ A,E by P ′ E . Then, P n A,E (a, e) = e −n(D(P ′ A,E PA,E )+H(P ′ A,E )) and |T n,E |Q E,n,inv,mix (e) = e −nH(P ′ E ) . That is, the condition P ).
Since P 
Proof: We show Lemma 45 by using Lemma 41, which will be given latter. We employ a generalization of the method used in [62, Appendix D] . First, we define the distribution P A,E;s as Given s ≥ 0, we choose an arbitrary distribution P 
